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Abstract:  This paper argues that scientific inquiry (1) creates its own cognitive autonomy within the 
interplay of research practices and possibilities for doing research, and (2) discloses, meaningfully 
articulates, and procedurally objectifies reality in a unique manner. Taken together, both claims 
characterize the position of hermeneutic realism which lays foundations for the radically anti-
foundationalist hermeneutic philosophy of science. Claim (1) opens a subject of meta-epistemological 
studies aiming at a complementarity between a hermeneutic theory of the facticity of scientific 
inquiry as a mode of being and an epistemological theory that works out in its own terms the 
conditions for having science’s cognitive specificity, whereas claim (2) is a necessary presupposition 
for studying how reality becomes meaningfully articulated within scientific practices. The position of 
hermeneutic realism is on a par with the thesis of interpretive internalism stating that the cognitive 
autonomy of scientific inquiry is achieved through the openness of inquiry to its milieus. This 
openness consists in a selective assimilation of external themes, goals, tasks, and other items. The 
paper also deals with some socio-political consequences from the thesis of interpretive internalism. It 
is argued that only scientific inquiry freed from social monitoring and political control is able to serve 
societal needs, preventing at the same time a politically initiated scientification of societies, i.e. a 
scientification guided by dubious economic and political interests, and accomplished through sciences 
that are not able to preserve their cognitive autonomy, thereby becoming exposed to manipulation 
and misuse. 
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Human existence has a being only in practices that constantly and 
continuously constitute meaning. Putting practices first is a common concern of all 
philosophers who try to defend a form of realism without committing to the God’s 
Eye point of view. The epistemic relationship is situated and takes shape in the 
medium laid down by practices. The hermeneutic philosophers of science advocate 
the primacy of scientific practices as a medium in which the epistemic positions 
(cum their norms and criteria) are generated, but strongly deny any account of this 
primacy in terms of causal interactions. For them, causal interactions also become 
meaningfully articulated within practices of inquiry. By implication, scientific 
practices are interrelated not by causal interactions but by relations of mutual 
interpretation. The interrelatedness of such practices brings into being the 
interpretative articulation of meaning as a prerequisite for delineating meaningful 
causal interactions. In raising this claim, the hermeneutic philosophy of science 
turns out to be a program irreducible to an interpretive theory of scientific 
communication. This philosophy is not about the cultural production of scientific 
texts mediating and propagating the outcomes of inquiry. It neither addresses the 
formation of audiences reading these texts, nor does it deals with the effective-
historical dynamics of receiving and aging of scientific results. The constitution of 
science’s cognitive specificity within the practices of inquiry, and the disclosure of 
domains of meaningful reality are the two subjects which invite unitary 
interpretation. The quest for such an interpretation is what the hermeneutic 
philosophy of science is all about. It is these two subjects that resist recasting in 
terms of a cultural hermeneutics concerned with the production and reception of 
texts.  
The first subject – the constitution of science’s cognitive specificity – is of 
meta-epistemological nature. Its treatment requires a kind of complementarity 
between a hermeneutic theory of the facticity of scientific inquiry as a mode of 
being and an epistemological theory that works out in its own terms the conditions 
for having the specificity mentioned. (In a tentative formulation, the 
epistemological theory I am speaking about is not of post-empiricist type. It does 
not look for a constitution of empirical facts within theoretical frameworks. From 
the standpoint of the hermeneutic philosophy of science, the formation of all 
theoretical frameworks is “always already” situated within the articulation of 
meaning. By putting the theoretical frameworks first, post-empiricist epistemology 
proves to be unable to study how the formation of these frameworks is constantly 
fore-structured by the articulation of meaning within [scientific] practices. Several 
versions of the post-empiricist philosophy of science lay claim to be interpretive 
enterprises. Yet their hermeneutic dimension is solely restricted to the interpretive 
correlations between theoretical terms and empirical data in process of theory 
construction. By contrast, the hermeneutic philosophy of science focuses on the 
interpretive-practical fore-structuring of this process.)  
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The second subject – the disclosure and the meaningful articulation of reality’s 
domain through scientific inquiry – is of ontological nature. Its treatment demands a 
hermeneutic ontology of how reality becomes meaningfully articulated within 
scientific practices. In addressing this subject, the hermeneutic philosophy of 
science counters any view that defends (or at least presupposes) the “diremption of 
reality”, i.e. the dichotomous division of the latter into a reality of “lived 
experience” an objectified reality that becomes alienated from the meaningfulness 
of this experience. The hermeneutic philosophy of science debunks the myth of a 
crucial divergence between what is meaningfully articulated and what becomes 
idealized and procedurally objectified. Taken together, the approaches to the meta-
epistemological and the ontological subjects outline a unitary hermeneutic-
ontological strategy of overcoming the “diremption of reality”. In this strategy, 
scientific inquiry is the only mode of being through which domains of reality 
become disclosed and meaningfully articulated while being subjected to procedural 
objectification. The hermeneutic philosophy of science needs neither the 
assumption that science is grounded in pre-scientific (lifeworld) experience and 
practices nor the assumption that within scientific inquiry there is a separation 
between the phronesis of practical constitution of contextual meanings and the 
procedural production of (allegedly) de-contextualized factuality. Against the first 
assumption this philosophy of science argues that all meanings instrumental in 
scientific inquiry are intrinsically produced, whereas the argument against the 
second assumption stresses that the same configurations of scientific practices 
which contextualize the articulation of meaning in the process of inquiry are also 
liable for the objectification of de-contextualized factuality. Overcoming the 
“diremption of reality” goes hand in hand with the formulation and defense of a 
thesis that I will call interpretive internalism. 
A domain of scientific inquiry is originally disclosed as a thematically 
delimited region that contains a potentially infinite number of research objects. 
These are objects that might be constituted in the process of inquiry. Thus 
disclosed, the domain is indispensably prepared-to-be-articulated within a certain 
tendency to fore-having, fore-seeing, and fore-grasping the potentially existing 
research objects. Following this tendency, the process of inquiry reveals and 
conceals – in actualizing the appropriated research possibilities – what has been 
disclosed in a specific manner. The tendentious revealment and concealment of a 
scientific domain resulting from the tendentious choosing and appropriation of 
possibilities for doing research in the process of inquiry is the characteristic 
hermeneutic situation in which the domain exists. Being within such a situation, the 
process of inquiry selectively appropriates possibilities for doing research at the 
expense of ignoring and sedimenting possibilities that would reveal (and conceal) 
the domain in an alternative fashion. The appropriation and actualization of a 
possibility for doing research changes the very horizon of possibilities – new 
possibilities emerge and possibilities that have been previously available are fading 
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out. At the same time, actualizing a certain possibility makes the configuration of 
scientific practices in which it is appropriated into a particular context of 
meaningful articulation. The appropriation of a possibility for doing research 
indispensably contextualizes both the process of inquiry and the articulation of a 
domain. 
In the thesis of interpretive internalism, science (as a mode of being in the 
world) articulates reality in a characteristic way due to the interplay of scientific 
practices and possibilities for doing research. In a corollary to this claim, the 
interrelated scientific practices, which disclose a domain of reality in a characteristic 
hermeneutic situation, enter into interplay with the possibilities upon which they 
project their interrelatedness whereby the domain disclosed becomes subjected – 
within this interplay – to an ongoing meaningful articulation. There are no 
meanings (and meaningful entities) in scientific inquiry constituted beyond the 
interplay of scientific practices and possibilities for doing research. Insisting on the 
tenability of interpretive internalism does not entail the claim that the process of 
inquiry is immune to the infusion of external themes, values, or goals. Scientific 
inquiry, especially under the conditions of technoscience, constantly reacts to its 
milieus by incorporating issues, problems, and task originating in a wide range of 
social-pragmatic contexts. It is precisely this incorporation that preserves the 
cognitive autonomy of scientific inquiry. The point is that the infusion of external 
task, themes, goals, etc. does not change the fact that all meanings operating in 
scientific inquiry are constituted within the interplay of scientific practices and 
possibilities for doing research. The cognitive autonomy of scientific inquiry is not 
enabled by a normative encapsulation of the process of inquiry. In interpretive 
internalism, this autonomy is rather achieved by an openness to the milieus that 
consists in a selective assimilation of external items. 
Joseph Rouse makes the case that the totality of scientific practices can only be 
separated from the rest of the cultural world of practices for conventional or 
pragmatic reasons. It is impossible (and unreasonable) to present this totality as a 
self-sufficient realm and as “a separable component of the world whose interface 
with other components is readily localizable.” (Rouse 2002, 165) This is why the 
cultural studies of science he aims at “take as their object of investigation the traffic 
between scientific inquiry and those cultural practices and formations that 
philosophers of science have often regarded as ‘external’ to knowledge.” (Rouse 
1996, 239) Any attempt at ascribing a significant autonomy to the realm of 
scientific practices faces the challenge of the traffic of technological, instrumental, 
experimental, and conceptual practices across the alleged boundaries. One can 
invoke in this regard also Rorty’s view that natural science is not a “natural kind”: 
There is no philosophically significant difference between the methodically 
organized practices of inquiry and the rest of human practices that – in an 
essentialist manner – divides culture into science and non-science. The hermeneutic 
realist does not deny the constant traffic (in Rouse’s sense) or the growing 
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diversification of (what Peter Galison calls) “trading zones” of practices that 
progressively efface the borderlines between scientific domains and their 
ambiences. Yet the hermeneutic realist denies that this effacement provides a 
rationale for abolishing the creation of cognitive autonomy within the hermeneutic 
circularity in which a domain of inquiry is disclosed, articulated, and objectified. 
In adopting the Heideggerian distinction between factuality and facticity, one 
can state that the thesis of interpretive internalism presupposes the production of 
procedurally objectified factuality within the facticity of inquiry. The ongoing 
meaningful articulation of a domain taking place in the interplay of practices and 
possibilities is the facticity of scientific inquiry. The objectified factuality consists 
of discrete structures that result from embedding data models in theoretical models. 
More specifically, the procedural production of objectified factuality is 
distinguished by five steps. They are related to (1) the acquisition of data, (2) the 
discovery of patterns and the construction of data models, (3) the experimental 
construction of phenomena that are to be describes and measured by data models, 
(4) the embedding of data models (as “empirical algebras”) in theoretical models, 
and (5) the saving of experimentally constructed phenomena whereby theoretical 
objects become contextually envisioned. (Ginev 2016, 209-240) The facticity of 
scientific inquiry, in turn, is characterized by (a) the configurations of interrelated 
scientific practices, (b) the contextuality of inquiry, (c) the potentiality-for-being of 
what is disclosed in a characteristic hermeneutic situation, (d) the ever changing 
(and “inexhaustible”) horizon of possibilities for doing research, and (e) the 
entanglement of each particular context of inquiry with domain’s ongoing 
articulation. 
The hermeneutic philosophy of science does not claim that there is one-to-one 
correspondence between the five steps of the procedural production of objectified 
factuality and the five traits characterizing the facticity of inquiry. It only argues 
that the continuous interplay of inquiry’s practices and possibilities constantly fore-
structures – in the tendentious manner of a characteristic hermeneutic situation – the 
production of objectified factuality as it is expressed in discrete structures. The 
factuality is always already situated in this interplay which – in every particular 
context anew – transcends what becomes objectified. The figure of situated 
transcendence – i.e. the figure of ever moving horizon that at once contextualizes 
what is situated in it and transcends each and every context – is a hallmark of the 
way in which scientific inquiry constitutes its specificity and articulates/objectifies 
reality uniquely. The processual aspect of situated transcendence takes the form of 
hermeneutic circularity. There are several hermeneutic circles of different sorts that 
epitomize various dimensions of the production of factuality within the facticity of 
inquiry. Let me mention some of them: the circle of selecting data within whole of 
admissible measurements; the circle of constructing data models within the whole 
of the relevant theoretical interpretations of a phenomenon; the circle of designing 
pertinent experiments within the whole of theoretical predictions; the circle of 
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selecting patterns of data within the whole of (possible) theoretical models that can 
save a predicted phenomenon; the circle of constructing theoretical models within 
the whole of scenarios allowed by a basic mathematical formalism; the circle of 
performing particular measurements within the whole of possible formal operations 
with the measuring outcomes, etc. In all of these cases, there are unavoidable part-
whole relations that consist in the mutuality and reciprocity between a transcending 
whole of possibilities and the situated choice of a possibility that has to be 
actualized. It is the totality of the hermeneutic circles of producing factuality-
within-facticity that enables interpretive internalism of scientific inquiry, thereby 
enforcing science’s cognitive specificity and autonomy by keeping hermeneutically 
open the process of inquiry. 
Unfolding the thesis of interpretive internalism also defines the political 
agenda of the hermeneutic philosophy of science. In advocating interpretive 
internalism, this philosophy makes the case that there is nothing dangerous in 
having scientific inquiry that resists external “democratic control” and determines 
its own values and goals. Dangerous is rather the political insistence on such a 
control. Only scientific inquiry freed from social monitoring is able to serve societal 
needs, preventing at the same time a politically initiated scientification of societies, 
i.e. a scientification guided by dubious economic and political interests. What can 
be treated as a really menacing situation is the unduly proposed scientification of all 
spheres of socio-cultural life through sciences that are not able to preserve their 
cognitive autonomy, thereby becoming exposed to political control, manipulation, 
and misuse. 
Evelyn Fox Keller formulated in the 1980s a dilemma that has subsequently 
played a pivotal role in science wars: Scientific knowledge is either the only kind of 
objective and truthful knowledge, or science is divorced from nature and married 
instead to culture, which implies that scientific knowledge is characterized by 
cultural relativism. Grasping the first horn of this dilemma would lead to the 
acknowledgement that only scientists are privy to objective truth and the authority 
of science is unassailable. (Fox Keller 1987, 45) Choosing the other alternative 
would compel us to make cultural relativism and the “polytheism of values” our 
religion. The champions of the hermeneutic philosophy of science believe that Fox 
Keller’s formulation expresses in several respects a wrong dilemma. First, it 
incorrectly assumes an ontic dichotomy between nature and culture. Second, the 
formulation introduces the opposition between objective knowledge and relative 
knowledge within a Cartesian framework. But the most significant deficiency 
consists in ignoring the ways in which the objectivity of scientific knowledge is 
contextualized without becoming relativized. Contextual objectivity without 
relativism is a formula advocated by the hermeneutic philosophy of science. 
Following this formula as a counterpart of interpretive internalism has tremendous 
socio-political consequences for fighting scientism without undermining the 
authority of science. 
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The more adequate are the reactions of the research process to its milieu, the 
higher is the process of inquiry’s plasticity and the leeway in choosing possible 
roads of inquiry. Without such a plasticity the external pressure would be 
destructive. On interpretative internalism, however, what becomes incorporated is 
not left unchanged. To reiterate, all themes, values, and goals infused in the process 
of inquiry become re-described in accordance with the possibilities that can be 
appropriated within the domain’s articulation. The incorporation of external tasks in 
the autonomous research is an assimilation of these tasks within the proper horizon 
of interpretation. In other words, the meaning of what becomes incorporated is 
recast in accordance with the interplay of scientific practices and possibilities for 
doing research. As already indicated, the view of interpretative internalism states 
that all meaning and meaningful entities in scientific inquiry is constituted in the 
process of inquiry. Scientific inquiry does not permit the import of external 
meaning that cannot be made “congruent” with the possibilities generated by the 
practices of inquiry, i.e. the possibilities whose appropriation – by the same 
practices which generate them – meaningfully articulates the domain of inquiry. 
Only external units that can be integrated into the research process through the 
appropriation of possibilities generated by the very process are admissible. The 
interplay of practices and possibilities in scientific inquiry filtrates what can be 
adopted as a research task from the non-scientific social worlds. Thus considered, 
scientific inquiry not only articulates its domain, but constitutes its relevant social-
political milieu. (If the process of inquiry proves to be unable to do this, it would 
become amenable to political pressure and manipulation.) Making external subjects, 
issues, problems, etc. to fit the intrinsic possibilities of doing research within the 
domain – and thereby incorporating the external demands into inquiry’s interplay of 
practices and possibilities – turns to be the intrinsic device of preserving the 
facticity of scientific inquiry. 
Curiously enough, well-elaborated case studies carried out by upholders of the 
so-called “finalization of science” – a controversial meta-scientific platform for 
investigating the incorporation of external aims into domains with “closed theories” 
whereby the formerly autonomous domains are transformed into socio-politically 
guided, task-oriented, research areas – have eloquently demonstrated that scientific 
inquiry manages to avoid the destiny of becoming a politically controlled and 
socially planned process thanks to its potential to project the being of entities 
implanted in contexts of inquiry upon its own horizons of possible research. By 
implication, the alleged finalization turns out to be rather a thematic proliferation of 
existing scientific domains. (Bonss, Hohlfeld, Kollek 1995) Thus, the selection of 
what should be counted as man-made factors of carcinogenesis is undoubtedly 
heavily dependent on political, commercial, and corporative interests. Identified as 
“entities” laden with such interests, these factors have been implanted – via the 
clinical discipline of oncology – in various research contexts of biochemistry, cell 
biology, genetics, histology, and developmental biology. During the post-war 
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development of the domains concerned the man-made carcinogenic factors have 
been abode by possibilities for studying anomalies in chromosomes, kinds of 
mutations, the transmission mechanism of genetic information, special metabolic 
chains within the cell, the ways in which antimetabolites operate as metabolism 
blockers, the interaction between viruses and cells at the genetic level, and 
trajectories of morphogenesis. (Hohlfeld 1983) 
With regard to the way in which scientific inquiry discloses the reality, the 
hermeneutic philosophy of science put forward a kind of realism about what is 
ready to hand within changing configurations of readable technologies and spaces 
of representation in the research process. This claim is in need of a specification. 
Scientific research collects pertinent data by manipulating entities that are ready-to-
hand within specifically constructed and/or conventionally delineated 
environments. The acquisition and processing of data take place in such 
environments. This is why the collected data are idiosyncratic to the instrumentally 
arranged environment in which they are produced. However, the process of inquiry 
manages – through the configurations of its practices – to distance itself from what 
is directly registered and read through the use of instruments, and to constitute 
research objects by modelling and saving phenomena. 
It is the procedural distancing from the immediate manipulation of what is 
instrumentally ready-to-hand that enables and warrants the autonomy of the process 
of inquiry as this autonomy is epitomized by the thesis of interpretive internalism. 
Having a (reflexively controllable) theoretical distance from what is directly ready-
to-hand in inquiry allows one not only to make theoretical predictions when saving 
phenomena, but also to devise and construct new instruments for verifying the 
predictions, thereby setting up new environments of immediate manipulation. But 
the way of distancing is prepared by the immediate manipulation and occurs within 
the environments of direct instrumentation. It is this instrumentation that produces 
distance from what is ready-to-hand in scientific inquiry. Therefore, arranging 
instrumental environments of data collection and (statistical) processing of data, on 
one the hand, and distancing from these environments for the sake of creating more 
sophisticated configurations of scientific practices, on the other, are events involved 
in relations of a mutual reinforcement. The (constructivist) attempts at coming to 
grips with these relations by employing models of strongly successive activities – 
from immediate manipulation of what is ready-to-hand to theoretical 
conceptualization – are doomed to failure. In stating this, I should like to raise the 
claim that the thesis of interpretive internalism is incompatible with any kind of 
constructivism. The discussion of this claim requires broadening the picture of 
scientific inquiry depicted so far. 
The approaches to inquiry developed in science studies (SSK and STS) that 
prioritize practices over knowledge exclusively work with the concept of 
(scientific) practice as rule-following and goal-oriented actions. Accordingly, these 
approaches are firmly tied to the objectivist paradigm of conceptualizing practices 
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as discrete (factual) units. On this paradigm, any particular practice form a 
contexture-of-equipment in which all entities enacted by instruments become ready-
to-hand. Designated by various expressions, the notion of a contexture-of-
equipment plays a crucial role especially in the conceptions of New 
Experimentalism. It serves an important function in the hermeneutic philosophy of 
science as well. Nonetheless, this is only a subsidiary function. The picture of 
scientific inquiry as a diversity of discrete and self-enclosed contextures-of-
equipment is not in harmony with the interpretive-phenomenological approach to 
scientific inquiry where the accent is placed on the continuity and the openness of 
the research process. Obviously, a laboratory’s environment as structured around 
the research instruments provides the most typical case in point for a contexture-of-
equipment in the process of inquiry. This is the environment in which science 
“brings objects ‘home’ and manipulate them on their own terms.” (Knorr Cetina 
1999, 27) The entities within this environment are ready-to-hand and subjected to 
the conditions of the local social order of a laboratory. 
Yet the notion of contexture is also extendable to the empirical (objectifying) 
sciences which are working with controlled observations rather than with repeatable 
experiments. Most of the observatories might be considered as environmentally 
circumscribed contextures-of-equipment. The ground-based astronomical 
observatory equipped with a permanently mounted Newtonian reflector for lunar 
and planetary observations is the classical example. However, in many types of 
observatories the condition of environmental localization of data collection and 
data-processing via instruments is either not fulfilled or strongly modified. These 
are observatories with rather virtual contextures-of-equipment. The most interesting 
case in point in this regard is provided by the so-called Ocean Observatories 
Initiative – a research driven network organized by National Science Foundation. 
The confluence of a number of emerging new technological capabilities (satellites, 
fiber-optic submarine cables, telecommunication cables, new sensors enabling in 
situ measurements, data archival systems that can retrieve volumes of data from 
arrays of sensors, and computer networks that bring real-time data) allows 
researchers to collect data on various scales by measuring physical, chemical, 
geological, and biological variables. It is this confluence that creates a virtual 
contexture-of-equipment. Put differently, the contexture of data collection is the 
very network of costal, regional, and global observatories (plus the facilities 
required for calibration of instrumentation). Yet the registration of unknown 
phenomena as measured by data-models occurs, as a rule, not in this contexture, but 
in specifically configured practices of inquiry or in (what I call) contexts of inquiry. 
Thus, for instance, the prediction of change in the marine environment requires 
practices of theoretical conceptualization, construction of mathematically 
sophisticated models, and unfoldment of suitable interdisciplinary methods. 
Though existing in a virtual environment, the contexture-of-environment of 
Ocean Observatory Initiative is clearly delineated. The next case shows that this 
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delineation is not always possible. I have in mind the case in which the environment 
of a research-driven data collection coincides with the environment of what is under 
investigation. The equalization of both environments, however, follows the way in 
which the respective domain of inquiry becomes disclosed in interrelated scientific 
practices. This equalization cannot take place before the incipience of the domain’s 
meaningful articulation. This is why the proper environment of what is investigated 
takes the form of an environmental contexture-of-equipment. Thus, for instance, the 
presuppositions of how to gather relevant data inform the way of delineating a 
suitable contexture-of-equipment in the domain of studying ecological succession. 
At stake is the controlled observation of succession as a process undergone by 
ecosystems (such as forests), provided that these ecosystems achieve – in the phase 
of maturity – an equilibrium between the community of (populations of) living 
organisms and its physical environment. (The equilibrium indicates a steady-state 
of the ecological community.) 
When ecologists are studying the successional modes of behavior, they are 
looking for patterns of successive stages. Establishing the physical environment in 
which such patterns of achieving ecosystems’ equilibrium is a way of constituting a 
contexture-of-equipment. The entities in this environment are, in a sense, indirectly 
manipulable through the practices of controlled observation in ecosystem ecology. 
Identifying the patterns in question involves, for instance, (a) research activities of 
measuring the increasing organic content and the increasing differentiation of levels 
of the mature soil of the ecological community which achieves an equilibrium with 
its physical environment, (b) research activities of registering changes in 
community’s structure resulting from the utilization of environmental resources, 
and (c) research activities of measuring the rate of replacement of populations of 
shorter-lived species by populations of longer-lived ones. All these activities – as 
involved in practices of controlled observation – indicate the way in which the 
physical environment becomes a contexture-of-equipment of dealing with entities 
that are, in a sense, ready-to-hand. Moreover, the successional dynamics through 
which an ecosystem achieves its maturity is measurable within this contexture. 
Against the background of the examples cited, one is to state that the 
interlinked activities – each of them following its rules and algorithms – and the 
material resources they utilize form a contexture-of-equipment that includes basic 
instruments by means of which entities that are ready-to-hand become manipulated. 
On this account, ready-to-hand is what has the character of being manipulable. To 
reiterate, the contexture-of-equipment of a scientific practice is most typically 
exemplified by the classical research laboratory. Peter Galison (1987, 75-80) traces 
the genesis of what one might call “non-classical laboratory environment” back to 
Ernest Rutherford’s electric counting devices and Charles T.R. Wilson’s cloud 
chambers. The new laboratory environment was spatially designed to allow the 
execution of many experiments coordinated by groups of experimenters. The main 
distinctive feature of this environment as compared with the classical laboratory 
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consists in the need for answering the questions of when and how experiments end 
in an essentially new way. The end is to be sought in the manifold of theoretical 
beliefs and instrumental practices nourished by the growing complexity of the 
laboratory environment. Despite the growing complexity, the tendency toward 
enclosing (spatially, operatively, socially, and instrumentally) the contexture-of-
equipment has not vanished. The changing “topology” of the laboratory spatiality 
offers new mechanisms of enclosing the experimental work in contextures-of-
equipment. 
To be sure, the contexture of any particular practice of experimentation is 
devised to be congruent with contextures organized by other scientific practices: 
There are entities ready-to-hand within it that can be transferred to other 
contextures. Yet each scientific practice keeps maximally enclosed its contexture-
of-equipment. The practitioners manage to do this by retaining the entities 
manipulable within the contexture’s environment. The transfer (and the import) of 
manipulable entities to (from) other contextures create some regular links between 
contextures. Yet transferring and importing such entities is not sufficient to create 
and maintain a whole network of contextures. Moreover, the inquirers try to keep 
the particular contextures enclosed. Enclosing the contexture allows them to 
represent the outcome of practice’s multifarious performance through homogeneous 
semiotic means. The autonomy of the contexture-of-equipment and the 
homogeneity of the semiotic representation of experimental practice’s outcome go 
hand in hand. 
Presumably, the laboratory contextures-of-equipment of research practices that 
collect pertinent data respond to natural orders by emulating them. It is a popular 
opinion that a laboratory has to reproduce a natural order. However, this opinion 
contradicts the thesis of interpretive internalism. In fact, the activities and actions 
taking place in a contexture-of-equipment respond only to what is meaningfully 
constituted within scientific inquiry. Elaborating on this formulation brings into 
play another important facet of interpretive internalism: Practices of 
experimentation, controlled observation, and data processing do not artificially 
reproduce or imitate a reality that is somewhere beyond the process of inquiry. 
Phrased differently, the readable technologies of these practices do not render 
objective factuality that is beyond – and not constituted within – the facticity of 
inquiry. Social constructivists seem to hold that it is the other way around. They 
consider the laboratory milieus as technological and semiotic embodiments of 
natural orders. Thus, according to Karin Knorr Cetina (1999, 26-32), the “natural 
order” becomes reconfigured as an order of signs in a laboratory contexture-of-
equipment (that by itself is characterized by a local social order). From the 
reconstruction of natural events and processes through instruments of 
experimentation – so her argument goes – physicists creates variables (as second-
order signs referring to data as first-order signs) that are designed to be employed in 
the formal models of theoretical physics. The reconstruction of natural orders and 
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the production of signs are construed in terms of practices of representation (in a 
sense more or less related to representational epistemology). In summary, the 
semiotic orders created within the socially organized environment of 
experimentation somehow reproduces something that is “out there”, and thus, what 
is studied becomes technological and semiotic artifacts constructed under laboratory 
conditions. 
On this account, the semiotic reproduction and representation of natural orders 
is universally valid for all kinds of scientific inquiry. Knorr Cetina provides the 
example of astronomy as a discipline that has been transformed (after the use of 
photographic plate) from a kind of research that surveys natural phenomena (or, 
observational field research) into a research enterprise that processes images of 
these phenomena. The insistence on such a transformation, however, still implies a 
strong opposition between manipulable entities and natural phenomena. The effects 
and images produced through laboratory manipulations should (somehow) 
represent the natural phenomena. This is the point of the “enculturation of natural 
objects” conception. The hermeneutic philosophy of science denounces this 
opposition because it is at odds with thesis of interpretive internalism. All 
phenomena studied in the environments of scientific practices are meaningfully 
constituted within these environments. They are neither outcomes of 
transformations nor do they represent something that by itself is deprived of 
meaning. They are phenomena of the reality disclosed and meaningfully articulated 
by scientific practices. Knorr Cetina wrongly admits, in my view, that there is an 
initial process of imaging the natural phenomena that precedes the articulation of 
meaning within the laboratory contexture-of-equipment. There is no room for an 
absolute (non-contextualized) distinction between natural and “cultural” in 
scientific research since the very distinction is always already “encultured” and 
properly carried out in the contexts of inquiry and not beyond them. 
All phenomena supposedly entitled to be saved in the research process are 
meaningfully produced within this process. (This claim is nicely defended by Paul 
Teller [2001] who – in contrast to Bas van Fraassen - argues that the phenomena to 
be saved are not to be directly described by empirical substructures of theoretical 
models. What data-models describe and measure are idealized and laboriously 
constructed phenomena that have little to do with the descriptions of phenomena 
predating data-models. Yet even these – more intuitive than methodically ruled – 
descriptions in the process of inquiry are always already contextualized by scientific 
practices. In admitting that scientific instruments create new phenomena, van 
Fraassen [2001] seems to accept Teller’s argument.1) From a constructivist 
  
1 Some constructivists of the so-called Erlangen-Konstanz school radicalize this role of the instruments 
for experimentation, and go on to defend the view that the commonplace that technology is applied 
natural science has to be reversed – natural science is applied technology. According to them, only 
when the scope of the natural-scientific experience is strongly determined by the technological 
infrastructure of measuring, experimenting, and constructing phenomena, scientific inquiry begins to 
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viewpoint, scientific inquiry turns out to be enclosed in a large cycle that involves 
observable and unobservable phenomena, data-models that measure phenomena, 
theoretical models that save phenomena, theoretical entities that supposedly receive 
empirical interpretations through saved phenomena, and predictions about the 
existence of new phenomena that can be saved if they are constructible by 
instruments. 
In contrast to constructive empiricists, social constructivists promise a way out 
of this cycle. Andrew Pickering and many others argue that behind every 
phenomenon lies a set of practices. This is an attractive formulation that implies 
multiple ways of arranging data, phenomena, models, and theoretical models, 
depending on the social contexts of inquiry. But it is burdened with an unpleasant 
problem consisting in the unclear status of “behind”. If practices are behind 
phenomena, then the former are causing the latter. Since practices supposedly 
“pertain” to culture, and phenomena are manifestations of nature, then the 
conclusion become unavoidable that culture is causing nature. The hermeneutic 
philosophy of science categorically rejects such an absurdity implied by the 
mysterious way in which practices are put behind phenomena. The champions of 
this philosophy insist that all phenomena are contextually revealed within 
contextualizing practices. Revealing-phenomena-within-practices is neither culture 
nor nature, and – what is much more important – it is not a causal (or whatever) 
relation of determination. It is rather a kind of hermeneutic circularity of meaningful 
articulation within the facticity of inquiry. 
I agree, all phenomena are, in a sense, constructed – by selecting and 
proceeding patterned data – within contextures-of-equipment through employing 
instruments of experimentation. These phenomena – as measured by data-models – 
become saved by theoretical models constructed within theories that have predicted 
the phenomena’ existence. However, the whole constellation – the selection of data, 
the discovery of patterns in the data outputs, the construction of data-models, the 
measurements of phenomena, the conceptual work of making theoretical 
predictions, the construction of explanatory models by specifying theory’s 
mathematical formalism, the search for a morphism between data-models 
describing phenomena and explanatory models, and eventually the theoretical way 
of saving these phenomena – takes place “always already” within a context of 
scientific practices in which the phenomena are revealed and projected upon 
possibilities. By implication, all constructive procedures – regardless of whether 
they will be treated as purely cognitive procedures, or as manifestations of social 
processes of negotiations – are rendered possible within the contexts of phenomena’ 
revealing. 
  
deploy the techniques of “idealizing stylization”. On this account, technology is not a particular sphere 
of social life, or a particular “symbolic form” (in Cassirer’s sense). Technology is the teleological 
essence of human existence and culture. (Janich 2015) 
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The distinction between a contexture-of-equipment (of a single practice) and a 
context of inquiry (formed by a configuration of practices) I introduced in the 
foregoing considerations looms large. It is a distinction that resonates the 
ontological difference between the objectified factuality and the facticity of inquiry. 
A single scientific practice is defined by (a) its functioning as a “readable 
technology” (Patrick Heelan), (b) its space of semiotic representation of what is 
read, and (c) its contexture-of-equipment where all entities being submitted to 
reading and representing are constantly ready-to-hand. Reading and representing 
are intertwined when producing meaningful results (expressible by signs of various 
kinds). A context of inquiry comes into being as a result of the appropriation of 
possibilities for doing research within a configuration of scientific practices. Thus, a 
context of inquiry contains the spaces of semiotic representation generated in the 
contextures-of-equipment of the practices involved in a configuration. Yet these 
spaces are not statically juxtaposed to one another. They constantly circulate and 
interpenetrate one another, thereby forming the semiotic expressivity of a context of 
inquiry. 
The manipulation of entities within a particular contexture-of-equipment and 
its environment produces signs that from the very moment of their initiation are – in 
contrast to the manipulable entities – beyond the contexture. Stating that the 
manipulable entities are tied to the particular contextures-of-equipment whereas the 
signs produced by the manipulation of these entities are constantly beyond the 
environmental arrangement of any particular practice of inquiry is a statement that 
ought to be construed in connection with the claim that each contexture is always 
already within the interplay of practices and possibilities of inquiry. The production 
of signs by reading manipulable entities proceeds within this interplay. 
Accordingly, the production of new signs is impossible without translation of signs 
already produced. This is why one ought to hold the view that the semiosis in 
scientific inquiry is stretched out over the whole facticity of inquiry. The readable 
technology and the space of representation which distinguish a particular contexture 
transmit signs from one to another practice of inquiry, thereby enabling the 
circulation of signs within the interplay of practices and possibilities. 
Since this translatability is not secondary to the semiosis but rather affords it, 
the circulation generates signs and symbols by translating semiotic systems across 
spaces of representation. In the sociology of scientific knowledge there is a tradition 
of specifying a class of scientific practices as representational practices. Though this 
tradition has produced several interesting views, the champions of the hermeneutic 
philosophy of science are not inclined to accept the separation of a special class of 
representational practices of inquiry. They rather try to show that each and every 
scientific practice is distinguished by a characteristic space of representation. This 
generalization of the representational dimension of scientific research might be 
vindicated by tackling the issue of how symbolically embodied representations-as 
mediate between the facticity of inquiry and the objectified factuality – a task that I 
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cannot undertake in this paper. It is the ongoing semiosis in scientific inquiry that 
tears the research process away of the particular environments and contextures-of-
equipment. 
From the viewpoint of hermeneutic phenomenology, interpretation of 
something-as-something is the primary engagement with the world that 
“circumspectively” (contextually) articulates the world. The articulated meaning is 
constantly represented-as-something. To represent something-as-something in the 
ongoing articulation of meaning is what Heidegger calls the hermeneutic-as of 
“circumspective concern”. Notoriously, Heidegger coins the expression 
“circumspective concern” for the pre-objectifying being-in-the-world and the 
corresponding meaningful articulation of the world. It is this interpretive mode of 
being that is entirely guided by the hermeneutic-as (as opposed to the apophantic-as 
of predication). The non-representational engagement with the world might be 
approached in naturalist terms by means of empirical studies that avoid Cartesian 
dualism. This should be a kind of naturalism without essentialism and objectivism, 
and without hypostatizing a concept of causality. Otherwise, the naturalist account 
of circumspective concern would run against the tenets of that ontology (and 
anthropology) which claim the primacy of the non-causal (and non-
representationalist) engagement with the world. (An interpretive theory of 
behavioral coping with the environment – as such theories are at stake in AI and 
cognitive science – could be an appropriate candidate for providing the intended 
naturalist account. It is another question that presently there is no full-fledged 
theory of this type.) 
In advocating the claim of interpretive internalism, the hermeneutic philosophy 
of science does not admit that the operative range of circumspective concern must 
be restricted to pre-scientific experience and practices. All practices and contexts of 
scientific inquiry are guided by circumspective concern as well. Yet the latter 
operates in science as intertwinement of reading and representing that dissolve the 
stability of any referential representation in the sense of representational 
epistemology. All kinds of interpreting something-as-something in scientific 
inquiry take place in the contextual circulation of the research practices’ spaces of 
semiotic representation. The thesis of interpretive internalism implies that the 
hermeneutic-as operates not only in the circumspective constitution of pre-scientific 
meaning, but also in the meaningful articulation of reality’s domains within 
scientific inquiry. 
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